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ASSET MARKET REACTIONS TO NEWS: 






An experimental asset market is used to test the effect of news concerning the underlying 
value of an asset on its trading price.  Statistical support is found for the hypothesis that 
investors  underreact  to  news  on  asset  valuation.  The  results  are  consistent  with  the 
viewpoint that price and valuation history have a significant effect on trader behavior.  
Two sets of experiments involve a single asset with a single payout at the end of the 
experiment.  Payout conditions are updated at the midpoint of the market trading period. 
The two sets of experiments have different payout expectations during the first half of the 
experiment but the payout expectations are identical after the midpoint.   Although the 
expected  payouts  are  identical  after  the  midpoint  of  the  market  trading  periods,  the 
trading prices for the two sets of experiments differ significantly even after their payout 
expectations  coincide.    This  provides  support  for  underreaction  and  indicates  that 
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1. Introduction 
 
In classical finance, one has the basic hypothesis that public information is available to 
everyone.    While  it  is  acknowledged  that  not  everyone  will  find  or  appreciate  this 
information, there is the assumption of a huge amount of capital that can utilize this 
knowledge to exploit any market inefficiency, thereby restoring the asset price to its true 
value.  Hence, efficient market theorists would argue that the market price of a security 
can be determined, for all practical purposes, by the assumption that everyone is perfectly 
informed.  Furthermore,  although  not  everyone  will  agree  on  the  correct  value  of  a 
security, the market acts as though there were unanimity among market participants on 
this assessment.  Thus, the classical theory would stipulate that the perturbations in asset 
prices have two sources: one is due to the randomness of the news entering the market, 
the other is a small amount of randomness due to mistakes made by some investors that 
are quickly exploited by the better informed.   
 
Although the viewpoint expressed above is espoused by many academic theorists and 
practitioners  offering  index  funds,  it  is  sharply  challenged  by  market  practitioners, 
particularly  those  who  are  involved  in  managed  funds.    These  practitioners  --who 
typically charge one or two percent of the fund’s value per year for selecting assets to 
hold in their portfolio and timing their purchases and sales-- believe that there  are a 
number of factors that distort prices, enabling a skilled manager the opportunity to buy at 
bargain prices and sell at full value or higher.  In fact, hedge fund managers typically 
charge these fees plus about 30% of the yearly profits.  Hence, the debate of market 
efficiency is more than academic. 
 
This assertion that asset markets are efficient because they instantaneously incorporate 
all  public  information  into  a  unique  assessment  of  value  via  asset  prices  has  been 
questioned from a number of perspectives.  Studies of market data have often concluded 
that market volatility is excessive when measured against classical concepts of valuation 
(Shiller 1981 and Pontiff 1997; see for example). Page 4 of 50 
The  possibility  that  large  numbers  of  investors  may  have  systematic  biases  has 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  academic  finance  and  economics  communities  in  recent 
years and has led to the rapidly growing area known as behavioral finance. Among these 
biases is the concept of “anchoring” whereby a decision maker focuses on a particular 
value or set of values for the asset, and neglects the possibility that the true value is very 
different  from  these  (Shefrin  2005).    Another  is  the  concept  of  “affect”  whereby  an 
attractive and appealing idea mesmerizes the investor so that a realistic assessment of 
value is short-circuited (Slovic et al. 2002).  Analogously, a company that is involved in a 
business that is unpleasant or unexciting will often be out of favor. Oil companies are 
often considered to be within this “ugly duckling” group until energy prices soar.  Often a 
stock or industry that is out of favor tends to remain at suppressed prices (i.e., a trading 
price that is low by measures of price/earnings, price/book ratios, etc.) reinforcing the 
undesirability.  There is also the possibility that a stock with a suppressed price is also a 
victim of anchoring, i.e., investors have become accustomed to observing the low stock 
price, and are skeptical of any improvement in price, and thereby fail to react optimally 
when  there  is  evidence  that  the  situation  has  turned  around.    Hence,  this  could  be a 
fundamental origin of underreaction, and could be tested experimentally.  Alternatively, 
if the market price were to increase disproportionately to news of improving prospects, it 
would suffer from an overreaction to news.  Both under- and over- reaction have been 
noted in the behavioral  finance literature.  Without clear criteria for the situations in 
which one can expect underreaction rather than the overreaction, it becomes easy for 
efficient market theorists to claim that if one cannot distinguish a priori between the two, 
the market must be efficient.   
 
One  of  the  underlying  causes  for  over-reaction  may  be  explained  through  the 
“representativeness heuristic” (Grether 1980).  In an early paper on behavioral influences, 
Grether designed a two-stage experiment in which participants were asked to make a 
choice in which the “ticket” payout depended on whether the regime was “strong” or 
“weak.”  A signal was received at the second stage that increased slightly the probability 
that the regime was strong.  Using a Bayesian probability formulation to recalculate the 
posterior odds, it would be clear that the probabilities are only slightly changed, and the Page 5 of 50 
value  of  the  ticket  would  be  slightly  higher.    However,  since  the  new  signal  is 
representative of a strong process, a participant who is subject to this behavioral bias will 
tend to overvalue the ticket.  Thus, one can view representativeness as a key cause of 
overreaction. There may be many other reasons for overreaction in the markets.  For 
example, in a competitive situation (e.g., a money manager who must keep up with the 
index  average  performance)  one  might  recognize  that  some  news  is  not  terribly 
significant in the long run, but may fear that the others will not share this calculation.  
Hence,  there  is  an  incentive  to  increase  one’s  positions  in  an  asset  based  upon  the 
uncertainty  involving  others’  reactions.    As  noted  in  Smith,  Suchanek  and  Williams 
(1998),  even  when  there  is  no  uncertainty  about  the  ultimate  payout,  there  is  the 
uncertainty involving others’ actions.  In the fundamental experiments of Beard and Beil 
(1994), it was noted that while agents seek to self-optimize, they tend not to rely on the 
self-optimization  of  others.    Thus,  in  any  situation  in  which  there  are  two  different 
calculations,  one  of  them  biased,  a  trader  who  recognizes  the  flaws  in  the  biased 
reasoning must nevertheless worry that many others could be subject to it, and that there 
could be a movement toward the prices reflecting the biased reasoning. 
 
The fundamental causes of underreaction are also complex. Practitioners have long 
noted that investors tend to use reference points to make their decisions.  In particular, 
they are aware of the price at which they purchased the asset and would like to avoid a 
loss. In this way, they “frame” their decisions and “anchor” potential trades about values 
such as the purchase price.  Kahneman and Tversky (1979) popularized this concept 
through a series of small experiments where they asked participants questions about their 
preferences.  The two sets of questions were identical in terms of the expected value, but 
differed only in that one set framed the choice as a loss, while the other framed it as a 
gain.  Extrapolating from this theory (see also Shefrin 2005) suggests that someone who 
purchased a stock at $50 and observed it fluctuating between $ 40 and $50 might have an 
incentive to sell when the price reaches $50 once again.  Consequently, as the stock 
moves from $40 toward $50, a person receiving a signal that the probability of the stock 
reaching  $60  is  significantly  higher  would  hold  if  he  is  evaluating  the  situation 
objectively, but sell if he is strongly influenced by the “anchoring” bias.  As the price Page 6 of 50 
reaches  $50  the  trader  has  the  opportunity  to  avoid  a  loss,  which  prospect  theory 
advocates suggest is a strong motivation to trade at $50.  Hence, one might postulate 
from prospect theory that “anchoring” is a fundamental cause of underreaction. 
 
In a particular situation, the various behavioral effects can suggest biases that are in 
different directions. For example, a slightly positive signal on the value of an asset might 
suggest overreaction through representativeness theory, but underreaction due to prospect 
theory and anchoring.  Distinguishing between the two in market situations is the focus of 
our research.  
 
In  a  typical  market  situation,  an  asset  (e.g.  common  stock)  trades  each  day  and 
important information (such as an earnings report) is released at the end of the trading 
day.  A significant difference between this situation and the Grether experiments is that 
continuous trading may have the tendency to establish a price through repetition and 
reinforcement.  This provides an example of “anchoring” in behavioral finance whereby a 
decision maker focuses on a particular value or set of values and neglects the possibility 
that the true value is very different from these (Shefrin 2005).  In other words, one might 
expect (based on the Grether experiments) that an update providing a small increase in 
payout would lead to an over-reaction.  However, persistent trading at a low price for an 
extended period might lead to an under-reaction to the announcement due to anchoring at 
the lower price that has been established during the  trading period.  Thus, a dynamical 
setting rather than a static or two-step process has some additional richness. 
 
While efficient market theorists view the trading price as a harmonious unanimity on 
the value of the security, many practitioners view it as a tug-of-war between different 
camps.    The  small  fluctuations  about  a  single  value  may  appear  superficially  as  an 
equilibrium, but in fact is a tense stalemate that is ultimately resolved, sometimes with a 
small amount of additional buying or selling arising from new information.  It is very 
common  for  different  large  investment  houses  to  offer  completely  incompatible 
assessments on everything from stocks to commodities to currencies.  However, even as 
they espouse very different views, they optimize their trading by placing their trades as Page 7 of 50 
close to the other camp as they are able.  In other words, if one investment company 
values a stock at $50 and another at $100 while the stock is trading at $75, the company 
trying to buy will not do so at $100.  They will try to buy as low as possible, namely near 
$75.  Hence, a casual observer of the market price will see the price fluctuating close to 
$75,  and  may  conclude,  falsely,  that  there  is  general  agreement  among  market 
participants  that  this  is  the  true  value.    Thus,  an  experiment  designed  to  understand 
market behavior can be made more realistic by giving disparate information to different 
groups.  This can also be used to understand the interaction between the assets of the 
groups and their assessment of value.   
 
To meet this objective we design a set of experiments in which there are 2 ten minute 
periods separated by a short break.  Participants trade an asset with a single payment 
occurring at the end of the second period.  The traders are classified into two distinct 
groups receiving different information but trade without the knowledge of other traders’ 
group or information.   In the baseline experiments, there is no  change in the payout 
probabilities during the break. In the second set of experiments, however, one or both 
groups  have  updated  payout  expectations  that  improve  the  expected  payout,  thereby 
matching  the  payout  of  the  baseline  experiments.    Hence,  the  anticipated  payout  is 
identical for both groups during the entire second half of the two sets of experiments. In 
the  absence  of  either  under-reaction  or  over-reaction,  there  should  be  no  statistical 
difference  between  the  two  treatments.    If  the  second  set  of  experiments  has  higher 
trading  prices  than  the  baseline  treatment,  it  would  suggest  over-reaction  and  be 
consistent with those studies suggesting that over-reaction will occur.  If they are lower 
than the baseline, it would suggest under-reaction and be consistent with anchoring and 
framing arguments. 
 
All of the methods of classical finance would imply that there should be no statistical 
difference in the second period prices (particularly near the end of the second period) 
between  the  two  treatments.  Thus,  any  difference  between  the  two  treatments  is 
attributable to non-classical effects, e.g., under-reaction or over-reaction.  Understanding 
the assimilation of new information is critical to the development of models of market Page 8 of 50 
dynamics  such  as  the  asset-flow  approach  (Caginalp  and  Balenovich  1999)  which 
incorporates the concepts of the finiteness of capital as well as fundamental tendency to 
buy  due  to  the  trend  as  well  as  the  valuation.    This  approach  has  been  useful  in 
discovering  the  underlying  causes  of  bubbles  in  asset  market  experiments  (Caginalp, 
Porter and Smith 2001). 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 2 is a detailed description of 
the design of the experiment, Section 3 analyzes the results, and Section 4 concludes the 
paper with some discussions of the results. 
 
2. Experimental Design  
 
A single asset was traded using an open-book (traders can observe all bids and asks 
being  offered  at  any  moment)  double  auction  on  a  computer  network.    In  each 
experiment, eight to twelve participants are given instructions and a practice session to 
ensure  that  they  had  understood  the  mechanics  of  the  auction.
1  Participants  in  the 
experiment were evenly and randomly assigned to trader types in the experiment which 
we will label as Group A and B.  Participants were not aware that there were groups, and 
only knew their own payout information and the history of market prices and transaction 
volume.  In one set of treatments, the groups were differentiated based on the news they 
received during the experiment.  In particular, both groups were informed that the asset 
traded would have a dividend of either 100 or 10 e-dollars at the end of the experiment. 
The e-dollars (i.e., experimental dollars that we also denote by E$) are converted to US 
dollars at the end of the experiment at a rate that was announced to the participants at the 
start  of  the  experiment.    Each  trader  is  given  information  (called  a  “hint”)  at  the 
beginning of the experiment on the probability of the two payouts. For example, our 
“hint75”  listed  on  a  participant’s  screen  “the  payout  of  the  share  at  the  end  of  the 
experiment is 100 e-dollars with a chance of 75% and 10 e-dollars with a chance of 
25%”.  Thus, the expected payout for hint75 is 100(75%)+10(25%)=77.5 e-dollars. 
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The experiment consists of two periods,
2  lasting 10 minutes each, with a one-minute 
break  in  between  the  periods.    During  the  break  news  concerning  a  change  in  the 
probability of the dividend payout was provided privately to each participant.  In the 
baseline  information  treatment,  there  was  no  news,  so  that  the  initial  probability 
assessments remained the same.  The participants in Group A were provided information 
in  the  form  of  hint75  while  the  Group  B  participants  were  given  more  pessimistic 
estimates of “hint25” -- “the payout of the share at the end of the experiment is 100 e-
dollars with a chance of 25% and 10 e-dollars with a chance of 75%”—with an expected 
payout of 32.5.  In one disparate information treatment,  news was released at the break 
between periods to the different groups which involved increasing the probability of the 
100 dividend payout.  In particular, group A started with “hint60”
3 that moved to hint75 
and  group  B  started  with  “hint10”
4  and  it  moved  to  hint25.  In  another  information 
treatment, we had both groups merge to the same probability estimate.  In one case, group 
A started with hint75 and it remained unchanged at the break while group B started with 
hint25 and it merged to hint75 at the break.  In a second merge treatment, group A started 
with hint60 and it moved to hint75  at the break while  group  B stared at hint10  and 
merged to hint75 at the break.  These information treatments allow us to examine price 
movements in a variety of information updates. 
  
 Previous  experiments  have  demonstrated  the  strong  role  of  the  ratio  of  cash  and 
number of shares in trading prices (Caginalp, Porter and Smith 1998), which we call 
liquidity.  To  ensure  robustness  of  the  experimental  conclusions,  we  created  some 
additional treatments varying the share and cash endowments of the two groups.  In the 
equal liquidity treatments, each participant was given the same initial portfolio of 500 e-
dollars and 10 shares or 1000 e-dollars and 10 shares.  In our other liquidity treatment we 
varied the cash to shares ratio of the two groups.  One group had more cash (750 in cash 
a 5 shares) while the other group had the base amount of 500 in cash and 10 shares.   
 
Table 1 summarizes our experimental design of liquidity and information treatments.   
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3.  Hypotheses   
 
   The default hypothesis is that, after the midpoint of the experiment, there will be no 
statistically  significant  difference  between  the  trading  prices  in  the  two  sets  of 
experiments, since both experiments consist of the same information after that point.  In 
other words, the default hypothesis that would be suggested by efficient markets is that 
prices should depend on the available information of expected payout, and not on the 
price  history.  However,  the  key  question  we  will  examine  is  whether  there  is 
underreaction  or  overreaction  to  the  updated  information  that  is  injected  during  the 
midpoint break of the two periods.  Recall that the “Info” sessions have lower expected 
payout in the first half of the experiment, but are then updated to the same expected 
payout  after the midpoint as the  “Base” sessions.   If investors underreact to positive 
information  after  a  prolonged  state  of  lower  expectations,  then  the  prices  in  the 
information experiments should be lower than the prices in the baseline experiments, 
namely those in which the information is the same throughout the experiment.  Such a 
result would provide support for the role of anchoring in financial markets and to the 
concept that price history has a strong effect on future prices even in the face of updated 
information on fundamental value. 
 
Alternatively,  if  investors  overreact  to  new  information,  then  the  information 
experiments would have higher prices in the second half than the baseline experiments 
even though the payout expectations are exactly the same during this latter part of the 
experiment.  This  would  be  consistent  with  “representativeness”  or  “affect”  whereby 
participants exaggerate the impact of the new and positive information. 
 
In addition to the fundamental hypotheses, we will also examine the effect of changes 
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4. Results 
 
  Appendix  1  contains  the  time  series  of  contact  prices  for  each  experimental 
session.  The graphs strongly suggest that there is anchoring in the decision-making of 
the market participants.  There seems to be no evidence of either overreaction to updated 
market  information.  To  formalize  these  ocular  results,  we  begin  with  the  following 
notation: 
 
Pre.PA= expected payout by Group A prior to midpoint information update; 
Pre.PB= expected payout by Group B prior to midpoint information update; 
Post.PA= expected payout by Group A after midpoint information update; 
Post.PB= expected payout by Group B after midpoint information update; 
 
These are calculated in the usual way by multiplying the probability with the outcome.  
For example, if Group A is given the hint that there is a 75% chance of a $100 payout and 
a  25%  chance  of  a  $10  payout,  then  Group  A  has  expected  payout  of 
(0.75)(100)+(0.25)(10)=$ 77.50. 
 
The cash endowments of the two groups are denoted by MA or MB, and the total 
number  of  shares  in  each  group  is  given  by  NA  or  NB.    The  asset  flow  differential 
equations approach and various experiments have shown the importance of the liquidity 










              (1) 
 
We first examine the relative impact of these variables on the trading prices in the 
absence of new information.  This can be accomplished by considering price just before 
the end of the first session (the 10
th minute), denoted Pre10.  The initial impact of the new 
information, combined with these variables can be studied by examining prices just after Page 12 of 50 
the start of the second session, denoted Post10.  Finally, one can study the prices just 
before the end of the experiment (the 20
th minute), denoted Pre20, in order to understand 
how this information is assimilated in time.  Since the updated information is presented 
prior  to  the  start  of  the  second  period,  a  perfectly  efficient  market  would  accurately 
reflect  the  current  outlook.    Even  if  there  is  some  delay  in  assimilating  the  new 
information, however, the effect of the information should be reflected in the prices at the 
end of the experiment.  These questions will be examined through a series of regressions. 
Since  many  prices  are  generated  by  the  same  group,  we  cannot  regard  them  as 
independent.  Consequently, an ordinary linear regression would overstate the statistical 
confidence.    This  problem  can  be  overcome  by  using  a  fixed  effects  model  that 
compensates  for  the  dependence  of  the  data  on  different  groups,  in  this  case  the 
experimental sessions (Pinheiro and Bates 2000).  Recapitulating the definitions, we have 
the following:  
 
Pre10:      The 9 trading prices just before the end of the first period  (at minute 10). 
Pre10_1:  The previous trading price of Pre10. 
Post10:    The 2
nd to the 10
th trading prices just after the start of the second period. 
Post10_1: The previous trading prices of Post10. 
Pre20:      The 9 trading prices just before the end of the second period (at minute 20). 
Pre20_1:  The previous trading price of Pre20. 
 
Using only the data of the first session, which does not involve any new information, 
we write,  
 
Log(Pre10) = α0 + α1Log(Pre10_1) + α2L + α3Pre.PB           (2) 
 
After the intercept, the first term is the trading price preceding the final trades in first 
period which we utilize in order to determine if there is a trend effect at the period end.  
The  second  term  in  the  equation  will  examine  whether  the  liquidity  value,  L,  has  a 
positive coefficient, as expected from previous experimental studies, indicating that price 
tends to move up as the cash per share ratio in the overall experiment increases.  The Page 13 of 50 
coefficient of the Pre.PB term is expected to be positive, which would indicate that the 
trading price rises as the expected payoff rises  (recall that Pre.PB also increases with 
Pre.PA).  First we calculate the logarithm of all prices, and then control for the session as 
a random effect, and we perform the regression using the SPlus fixed effects model on 
(2).  Table 2 provides the estimates of our model.  
   
As expected, the coefficients of both L and Pre.PB are positive, and significant.  We 
find  no  support  for  any  trend  (coefficient  of  Log(Pre10_1)  as  prices  have  essentially 
settled almost ten minutes after the start of trading.   
 
Next, we focus on the impact of the new information that is released in between the 
first and second periods for some of the treatments.  We let INFO denote the indicator 
variable that equals 1 when there is information leading to an upgrade of the expected 
payout, and zero otherwise.  A fixed effects linear regression analysis is then performed 
for the trading price just after the second session starts, i.e., Post10.  The fixed effects 
mode we estimate is: 
 
Log(Post10) = α0 +  α1  Log(Post10_1) + α2 L + α3 INFO + α4 Post.PB 
 
Table 3 contains the estimates of this model. 
 
In addition to this initial reaction to the new information, one can examine the final 
trades  of  the  experiment  to  determine  whether  the  underreaction  that  is  evident 
immediately after the announcement is remedied.  This yields the regression model and 
results: 
 
  Log.Pre20 = α0 +  α1  Log(Pre20_1) + α2L + α3 INFO + α4Post.PB 
 
As  indicated  by  Table  4,  the  regression  shows  that  there  is  a  significant  negative 
coefficient for INFO, indicating that experiments in which the expectation was lower for 
one or both groups corresponded to lower prices near the end of the experiment even 
though the expectations were identical in the second half. This suggests that the under-Page 14 of 50 
pricing observed during  the initial part of the second period persist until the end of the 
experiment. 
 
4. Conclusions  
We have conducted a series of experiments in which participants trade an asset that 
has  a  single  payout  at  the  end  of  two  periods  of  ten  minutes  each.  In  some  of  the 
experiments the information given to some or all traders was updated at the end of the 
first  ten  minute  period,  while  it  was  left  unchanged  in  other  experiments.  The 
experiments also differed in terms of the cash to asset level of participants (liquidity 
levels). Previous work has shown that the liquidity is an important factor in determining 
trading prices, so a range of liquidity levels were used for robustness. 
The  data  has  been  analyzed  using  a  series  of  mixed  effects  regressions  that 
compensate for heteroskedasticity, or the fact that many data points are generated by the 
same  group.  The  first  regression  concerns  only  the  first  period,  entailing  no  new 
information during the time period analyzed.  Each of the nine prices at the end of this 
first period is regressed against the expected payout, the liquidity and the previous trading 
price.  As  expected,  the  trading  prices  increase  with  increasing  expected  payout  and 
liquidity. These are highly significant statistically with p-values of 0.0045 and 0.0015 
respectively. The dependence on the previous trading price is not significant. Although it 
was expected from our previous results, the role of liquidity remains strong even after 
much trading has occurred, suggesting that it is not due to initial confusion or lack of 
familiarity with the trading system. 
The  next  regression  explores  the  impact  of  new  information  by  examining  the 
dependence of the first nine trades of the second period on the payout, liquidity and 
previous  price,  plus  the  dummy  variable  (INFO)  that  is  defined  as  1  if  there  is  new 
information and 0 if there is none. The INFO variable is highly significant, with a p-value 
of 0.0047. The negative value indicates that those experiments in which the information 
was  updated  exhibited  lower  trading  prices  during  the  second  half  compared  to  the 
experiments  in  which  the  information  remained  the  same.  Two  sets  of  experiments 
featuring identical expected payout during the second half nevertheless differ in terms of 
trading price depending on the conditions that prevailed in the first half. Hence, the lower Page 15 of 50 
trading price observed in the experiments featuring a more subdued past demonstrates a 
strong  deviation  from  any  concept  of  optimization  (e.g.,  Bayesian)  that  utilizes  only 
current information. 
The  issue  of  whether  these  lower  trading  prices  are  transient  is  examined  in  the 
subsequent regression that differs from the previous one in that we utilize the last nine 
trades of the second period. Using identical independent variables we find results that are 
quite similar, indicating that the lower prices resulting from the lower expectations of the 
first period are persistent in time. In fact, the INFO variable is still negative and even 
larger in magnitude. The main difference between the two sets of regressions (first versus 
last nine trades of the second period) is that the role of liquidity and the expected payout 
are both larger at the end of the experiment. It is not entirely surprising that some time is 
required for traders to assimilate the expected payout. However, one may have predicted 
that  the  role  of  liquidity  would  diminish  as  traders  have  more  time  to  consider  the 
expected payout. The result that the impact of liquidity increases with time suggests a 
deeper role for liquidity. In particular, as the trading evolves, the fact that there are more 
dollars chasing the same number of shares tends to influence how people place their bids 
and asks. A higher liquidity level means that there are more dollars with which one can 
bid, thereby raising the price that in turn influences others to raise their bids and asks. 
The fact that there is a significant trend term during the initial trades of the second period 
suggests that rising prices influence trading decisions. The trend term is not significant 
during the last nine trades by which time the price has settled. The asset flow used by 
Caginalp and collaborators since 1989 has indicated a complex relationship between the 
trend, the past history of prices and valuations and current valuations. The positive trend 
term in the initial trades of the second period is consistent with the expectations of this 
theory.  In  particular,  consider  the  experiments  in  which  one  of  the  groups  receives 
updated information while the other does not. The group receiving no new information 
has the same expected payout, but notices rising prices that indicate that perhaps others 
have information upgrading the payout, and react by bidding higher for the asset. 
A number of the questions arising have the potential to be addressed by additional 
asset market experiments. With a larger number of experiments that differ only in the 
distribution  of  assets  among  groups  (defined  as  receiving  or  not  receiving  updated Page 16 of 50 
information)  one  can  hope  to  obtain  enough  data  to  understand  the  motivations 
underlying  the  higher  prices.  A  pilot  experimental  study  on  these  questions  was 
performed  in  Caginalp  (2002)  where  the  asymmetric  information  was  given  to  three 
groups  of  participants  with  varying  levels  of  cash.  While  trading  prices  reflected  the 
additional information given to just one of the three groups, a large amount of additional 
cash led to prices that were much higher than could be expected even with all of the 
information. This leads to a number of questions. If information is received by only some 
of  the  participants  what  is  the  mechanism  whereby  the  market  assimilates  that 
information? Does the price reach the level that it would if all participants received the 
information?  What is the time scale on which the new equilibrium (or steady state) price 
is reached and how does it depend on the fraction of assets owned by the group receiving 
the new information?  
In  summary,  our  statistical  analysis  provides  support  for  the  assertion  that  market 
prices underreact to information that upgrades an expected payout following a prolonged 
period of less positive information and prices.  This means that the price (when adjusted 
for the other variables such as liquidity) is lower in the experiments featuring an upgrade 
of the payout than it is for the experiments having the higher expected payout from the 
start.    Furthermore,  this  underreaction  persists  throughout  the  remainder  of  the 
experiment, providing support for the concept of anchoring in asset price dynamics.  If 
fundamentals  and  trading  prices  are  low  for  a  prolonged  time,  then  improvement  of 
fundamentals does not lead to the same price that would be attained if the fundamentals 
were always high.  In other words, the market price in our experiments is not simply a 
function of the current expectations, as efficient market theory and classical economics 
would predict.  But rather, the trading price depends strongly on the past price history of 
the asset.  Even in this experimental setting where the fundamentals are clearer than they 
are in field markets, participants appear to be influenced by either the lower price or the 
lower fundamentals of the past.  On a practical level, this study provides some support to 
value managers who claim that bargains among out-of-favor stocks persist for some time. 
The findings of under-reaction – possibly as a consequence of anchoring – appear, at 
first glance, to be in contrast to the Grether experiments where an update providing a 
small increase in payout leads to an over-reaction. One factor that distinguishes the two Page 17 of 50 
types of experiment is time. In the two-step experiment of Grether, the new information 
is only the second piece of information, and there has been no opportunity to observe 
others’ reactions in the intervening time. In our experiments, there is a significant amount 
of time and trading that occurs prior to the release of the new information. It is possible 
that there is some tendency for over-reaction to the new information that is much smaller 
than a competing tendency for under-reaction that is caused by the nature of trading. In 
other words, when the updated information (suggesting a higher payout) is released at the 
start of the second half of our experiments, some traders may react in accordance with 
representativeness rather than Bayesian strategy and be prone to overreacting. However, 
others may be focusing on the trading that has occurred, and remain skeptical of the new 
information. If the latter dominate during the initial trades of the second period, then 
traders who initially were prone to over-reacting may be readjusting their strategy in light 
of the information on others’ strategies obtained through observing the trading prices. 
Undoubtedly, the effect of over-reaction to new information (due to representativeness) 
observed by  Grether is  present in our experiments; however, other  factors leading to 
under-reaction appear to be stronger under the conditions of our experiments. Thus, one 
might regard under-reaction and over-reaction as competing effects, just like stability and 
instability, with the winner of the competition depending on many factors that are yet to 
be discovered. 
 
One of these factors may be closely related to prospect theory. Behavioral finance has 
shown that decision makers treat potential losses differently from gains.  When the news 
upgrades the payout at the midpoint of the experiment, there is the possibility of greater 
profits for those who wish to purchase more of the asset.  However, failure to do so will 
not lead to loss.  At this point in the experiment, the participants have come to regard the 
current value of the stock plus cash as their own.  By not rushing to buy more shares, they 
are not losing any money that they have become accustomed to regarding as their own.  It 
is possible that with short selling or selling of futures contracts there would be some 
traders scrambling to cover their shorts and bidding up prices aggressively.  This could be 
a source of over-reaction. 
 Page 18 of 50 
Ultimately, the issues of under-reaction and over-reaction are at the heart of behavioral 
finance. If these effects did not exist in a statistically verifiable sense, then there would be 
no change in the trading price due to behavioral effects, and the classical paradigm would 
be  realized.  Moreover,  if  the  effects  of  under-reaction  and  over-reaction  cannot  be 
distinguished a priori even with the comprehensive information that we have in asset 
experiments, then it would be difficult to build behavioral finance into a quantitative and 
predictive  science.  Thus,  developing  an  understanding  of  the  conditions  that  lead  to 
under-reaction and over-reaction, respectively, is an essential step in understanding the 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
1 The experimental instructions can be found in the Appendix 2. 
 
2 The dividend was realized after period 2. 
 
3 The message for hint60 was “the payout of the share at the end of the experiment is 100 
e-dollars with a chance of 60% and 10 e-dollars with a chance of 40%” 
 
4 “the payout of the share at the end of the experiment is 100 e-dollars with a chance of 
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Table1: Experimental Design 
Number 




Treatment*  Session 





Shares  in 1st period 
in 2nd 
period 
Base_1  3  A  hint75  hint 75 




10  hint25  hint 25 
Base_2  3  A  750  5  hint75  hint 75 
    B  500  10  hint25  hint 25 
Base_3  3  A  500  10  hint75  hint 75 
    B  750  5  hint25  hint 25 
Base_4  2  A  hint75  hint 75 




10  hint25  hint 25 
Info_1  3  A  hint60  hint75 




10  hint10  hint25 
Info_2  3  A  750  5  hint60  hint75 
    B  500  10  hint10  hint25 
Info_3  3  A  500  10  hint60  hint75 
    B  750  5  hint10  hint25 
Info_4  1  A  hint60  hint75 




10  hint10  hint25 
Merge_1  3  A  hint75 




10  hint25 
hint75 
hint 75 
Merge_2  3  A  hint60 








Caption:  To read the table, “Base_1” features an endowment $500 (e-dollars) and 10 
shares for both groups: “Base_2” endowed Group A with $750 and 5 shares, while Group 
B was endowed with $500 and 10 shares. All the four “Info” treatments have the same 
endowments with their corresponding “Base” treatments, but instead of having the same 
hints throughout the whole experiment, “Info” treatments updated the subjects during the 
midpoint break with higher expected payout for the second session. Comparing “Info_1” 
and “Base_1” we note that each has exactly the same endowments, but “Info_1” initially 
gives Group A “hint60,” with expected payout 100(.6)+10(.4)=64, and gives Group B 
“hint10,” with expected payout 100(.1)+10(.9)=19. During the midpoint break, Group A 
was updated with “hint75,” and Group B was updated to “hint25,” i.e., the same level of 
expected payouts as in the “Base_1” treatment. 
 
*hint75: The payout is 100 with probability=75%, 10 with probability =25%; hint25: The payout is 
100 with probability =25%, 10 with probability =75%; hint60: The payout is 100 with probability =60%, 
10 with probability =40%; hint10: The payout is 100 with probability =10%, 10 with probability =90%. 
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Table 2:  Regression Estimates 
(Number of Observations = 243; Number of Groups =27) 
  Value  Std.Error  DF  t-value  p-value 
(Intercept)  2.119391  0.2948915  215  7.187018  <.0001 
LOG(Pre10_1)  0.037886  0.0661349  215  0.572854  0.5673 
L  0.009439  0.0026394  24  3.576149  0.0015 
Pre.PB  0.022961  0.0073149  24  3.138894  0.0045 
Caption: The table contains the estimates of the fixed session effects regression in which 
the  log  price  of  the  first  ten  contracts  after  the  information  update  is  considered 
dependent on a fixed amount, plus the log of ten contract prices prior to the update, plus 
the level of liquidity in the market and the expected payout to group B prior to the update.  
Both liquidity and the initial payout are positive and significant as predicted, but there is 
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Table 3:  Regression Estimates with Information Dummy 
(Number of Observations = 243; Number of Groups = 27) 
  Value  Std.Error  DF  t-value  p-value 
(Intercept)  1.824148  0.2526954  215  7.218765  <.0001 
LOG(Post10_1)  0.424578  0.0529105  215  8.024457  <.0001 
L  0.004093  0.0018865  23  2.169859  0.0406 




Post.Pb  0.003218  0.0020059  23  1.604100  0.1223 
Caption:  The log of first 10 contract prices after the information is regressed, using fixed 
effects  on  experimental  sessions,  against  the  trend  represented  by  the  log  of  the  10 
contract prices prior to the information update.  In addition, liquidity as measured by total 
cash to total shares, along with an information dummy to capture an information event 
that increases the expected payout and the initial expected payout of group B.  As in the 
previous tables, liquidity and initial payout expectations are positive and significant while 
the trend is not significant.  Information has a significant negative effect suggesting an 
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Table 4:  Regression Estimates 
(Number of Observations = 243; Number of Groups = 27) 
  Value  Std. Error  DF  t-value  p-value 
(Intercept)   2.530798  0.5400523  215  4.686210    <.0001 
Log(Pre20_1)   -0. 006639  0.0653174  215  -0.101643    0.9191 
L  0.011170     0.0050320    23  2.219718    0.0366 
INFO  -0.326043  0.1757902    23  -1.854727    0.0765 
Post.PB  0.012929  0.0054016    23  2.393592    0.0252 
Caption:  The log of first 10 contract prices after the information is regressed, using fixed 
effects  on  experimental  session,  against  the  trend  represented  by  the  log  of  the  10 
contract prices prior to the information update.  In addition, liquidity as measured by total 
cash to total shares, along with an information dummy to capture an information event 
that increases the expected payout and the initial expected payout of group B.  As in the 
previous tables, liquidity and initial payout expectations are positive and significant while 
the trend is not significant.  Information has a significant negative effect suggesting an 
under reaction.  Prices at the end of period 2 reflected in the log of the prices prior to the 
last 10 trading prices in period 2 is not significant.  This suggests that underreaction has 
not been remedied after the information amount.  The results from Table 4 suggest that 




















Appendix 1: Time Series of Contract Prices per Session 
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